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Pennsylvania Mines Corporation ("PMC") appeals a 
judgment declaring it responsible for providing health 
benefits for certain of its former employees, coal miners 
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who are now disabled. The main issue in this appeal is 
whether these miners are eligible to receive health benefits 
under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit (Coal) Act of 
1992, 26 U.S.C.A. SS 9701-22 (West Supp. 1999). The chief 
issue before us was addressed in recent decisions of the 
Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits. See Penn Allegh 
Coal Co. v. Holland, 183 F.3d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Holland 
v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1999). 







The provision of pension and health benefits to coal 
miners has a long and involved history, which has been 
chronicled by both the Supreme Court, see Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998) (plurality 
opinion), and by various courts of appeals, see, e.g., Anker 
Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161 (3d 
Cir. 1999); Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 
597 (4th Cir. 1999). Because an understanding of the labor 
agreements governing mine workers' health and pension 
benefits provides important background information, we 
summarize them briefly below. 
 
In 1947, the United Mine Workers of America ("UMWA") 
and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association ("BCOA"), 
a multiemployer group of coal producers, agreed upon the 
first of a series of National Bituminous Coal Wage 
Agreements ("NBCWA's") to settle a nationwide coal strike. 
See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2137; Anker 
Energy Corp., 177 F.3d at 164; Unity Real Estate Co. v. 
Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 653 (3d Cir. 1999). These NBCWA's 
set the terms and conditions of employment in the coal 
industry and provided health and pension benefits for 
miners. See Anker Energy Corp., 177 F.3d at 164. The 1947 
NBCWA was modified in 1950. Both the 1947 and the 1950 
NBCWA's were financed by a per-ton levy on coal produced 
by signatory operators--that is, those bituminous coal 
producers who, through the BCOA, were subject to the 
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NBCWA. Neither agreement promised specific benefits; 
rather, the benefits were subject to cancellation or change 
depending on the discretionary judgment of the NBCWA's 
trustees. See Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2138; Anker 
Energy Corp., 177 F.3d at 165. 
 
The 1950 NBCWA remained largely unaltered until 1974, 
when, partially in response to the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. S 1001 et 
seq., the UMWA and the BCOA negotiated a new 
agreement. See Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2139. 
The new NBCWA created four trusts, two to deliver pension 
benefits to miners and two to deliver non-pension benefits, 
such as health care coverage, to miners. Under the new 
agreement, the UMWA 1950 Benefit Plan and Trust (the 
"1950 Plan") provided non-pension benefits to miners who 
retired before January 1, 1976, while the UMWA 1974 
Benefit Plan and Trust (the "1974 Plan") provided non- 
pension benefits to miners who either were active or who 
had retired after 1975. See id. Unlike the earlier NBCWAs, 
the 1974 Plan provided for lifetime medical benefits for 
retired miners. See id. 
 
The increased expense that accompanied the provision of 
lifetime medical benefits, combined with a decrease in coal 
revenues as alternate energy sources developed, created 
financial problems for both the 1950 and 1974 Plans. See 
id. at 2140. The next NBCWA, executed in 1978, altered the 
financing scheme that governed the 1950 and 1974 Plans 
by assigning responsibility individually to signatory 
employers for the health care of their own active and retired 
employees. As a result, coal operators subject to the 1978 
NBCWA, such as PMC in this case, created their own 
individual employer plans ("IEP's") to provide benefits for 
their employees. The 1974 Plan remained in effect, but only 
to cover "orphan" retirees -- those miners whose employers 
were no longer in business in 1978. Id.; Anker Energy 
Corp., 177 F.3d at 165. 
 
Despite these financial modifications, the 1978 NBCWA 
and subsequent agreements soon experienced financial 
difficulties. In 1992, prompted by a lengthy strike against 
the Pittston Coal Company, Congress passed the Coal Act 
to "identify persons most responsible for plan liabilities in 
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order to stabilize plan funding and allow for the provision 
of health care benefits to such retirees." Pub. L. No. 102- 
486, S 19142(a)(2), Stat. 2776, 3037 (1992) (quoted in Big 
River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d at 601). 
 
To accomplish this goal, the Coal Act legislates three 
major changes in the structure of health benefits for 
miners. First, it consolidates the 1950 and 1974 Plans in 
the UMWA Combined Benefit Fund (the "Combined Fund"). 
See 26 U.S.C.A. S 9702(a)(2). This fund provides health and 
death benefits to coal industry retirees who, as of July 20, 
1992, were eligible to receive and were receiving benefits 
from the 1950 or 1974 Plans. See 26 U.S.C.A.S 9703(a), (f); 
Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d at 601. 
 
Second, the Coal Act requires signatories to the 1978 and 
subsequent NBCWAs to maintain coverage through their 
IEP's for two classes of employees. The first class is 
comprised of "any individual who, as of February 1, 1993 
[was] receiving retiree health benefits from an individual 
employer plan maintained pursuant to a 1978 or 
subsequent coal wage agreement." 26 U.S.C.A.S 9711(a). 
The second class is comprised of 
 
       "any individual who, as of February 1, 1993,[was] not 
       receiving retiree health benefits under the individual 
       employer plan maintained by the last signatory 
       operator pursuant to a 1978 or subsequent coal wage 
       agreement, but ha[d] met the age and service 
       requirements for eligibility to receive benefits under 
       such plan as of such date." 
 
26 U.S.C.A. S 9711(b)(1). Miners who met the age and 
service requirements for eligibility to receive benefits under 
an IEP as of February 1, 1993, but who were not receiving 
such benefits, had to retire by September 30, 1994, to be 
eligible for coverage pursuant to the Coal Act. Id. ("This 
paragraph shall not apply to any individual who retired 
from the coal industry after September 30, 1994 . . . ."). 
Those who meet the eligibility requirements of 
subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) are guaranteed 
coverage "for as long as the last signatory operator (and any 
related person) remains in business." 26 U.S.C.A.S 9711(a), 
(b). The Coal Act clarifies that "a person shall be considered 
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to be in business if such person conducts or derives 
revenue from any business activity, whether or not in the 
coal industry." 26 U.S.C.A. S 9701(c)(7). 
 
Finally, the Coal Act establishes the 1992 UMWA Benefit 
Plan (the "1992 Plan") to provide coverage to two classes of 
eligible beneficiaries. The first class consists of any 
individual who "but for the enactment of [the Coal Act] 
would be eligible to receive benefits from the 1950 UMWA 
Benefit Plan or the 1974 UMWA Benefit Plan, based upon 
age and service earned as of February 1, 1993." 26 U.S.C.A. 
S 9712(b)(2)(A). The second class consists of any individual 
"with respect to whom coverage is required to be provided 
[by an IEP], but who does not receive such coverage from 
the applicable last signatory operator . . . ." 26 U.S.C.A. 
S 9712(b)(2)(B). The Coal Act provides a mechanism for the 
1992 Plan to recover premiums from the appropriate IEP if 
the IEP improperly denies coverage and the 1992 Plan 
provides coverage pursuant to S 9712(b). 26 U.S.C.A. 
S 9712(d). In no event, however, does the statutory coverage 
of the 1992 Plan extend to individuals who retired from the 
coal industry after September 30, 1994. See 26 U.S.C.A. 
S 9712(b). 
 
The final piece of the coverage puzzle is the 1993 UMWA 
Benefit Plan (the "1993 Plan"), which was created not by 
statute, but rather through collective bargaining. 1 The 1993 
Plan provides benefits to any individual who "would be 
eligible to receive benefits from the 1974 Benefit Plan but 
for the passage of the Coal Act, is not entitled to benefits 
under the Coal Act, and whose last signatory employer was 
no longer deriving revenue from the production of coal," 
App. at 205, on December 16, 1993, see App. at 203, 206. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As Congress recognized when it passed the Coal Act, some retirees 
would receive benefits through subsequent, private collective bargaining 
agreements rather than through the mandatory terms of the Coal Act. 26 
U.S.C.A. S 9711(e) ("The existence, level, and duration of benefits 
provided to former employees of a last signatory operator (and their 
eligible beneficiaries) who are not otherwise covered by this chapter and 
who are (or were) covered by a coal wage agreement shall only be 
determined by, and shall be subject to, collective bargaining, lawful 
unilateral action, or other applicable law."). 
 




The primary issue in this case is whether PMC, through 
the IEP it maintains, is responsible for providing health 
benefits to eight miners who formerly were employed by 
PMC. PMC withdrew from the coal business in 1992, but 
was a signatory to the 1988 NBCWA, pursuant to which it 
maintained an IEP. Though it withdrew from the coal 
business, it still derives revenue from business activities, 
and is therefore still considered "in business" for purposes 
of determining its obligations under the Coal Act. 26 
U.S.C.A. S 9701(c)(7). 
 
Six of the eight miners at issue here became disabled 
because of an on-the-job accident (hereafter, "disability 
pensioners"), and the remaining two became disabled as a 
result of accidents suffered outside of the job premises 
(hereafter, "disabled miners"). The disability pensioners 
became disabled before September 30, 1994, but did not 
actually file their disability pension applications until after 
that date. 
 
PMC denied coverage for all eight individuals. The 1992 
Plan then provided health benefits to these individuals and, 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. S 9712(d), now seeks 
reimbursement of the premiums for the coverage provided, 
as well as an injunction directing PMC to provide coverage 
pursuant to S 9711(b)(1). 
 
PMC argues that it is not obligated to provide health 
benefits to either the disability pensioners or the disabled 
miners because: (1) their pensions are not based on having 
met age and service criteria as of February 1, 1993, but, 
instead, are based on having become disabled; and (2) in 
any event, they did not retire--which PMC argues requires 
them to have filed their pension applications--until after 
the September 30, 1994, cutoff for eligibility set forth in 
SS 9711(b), 9712(b). PMC claims instead that the miners at 
issue should receive benefits from the 1993 Plan and seeks 
an injunction directing the 1992 Plan to cease from 
"diverting individuals who are properly beneficiaries of the 
1993 Benefit Plan" to PMC's IEP or to the 1992 Plan. App. 
at 50. PMC further argues that even if the disability 
pensioners are entitled to health benefits, the disability 
miners are not. 
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The District Court rejected these arguments and held 
that PMC was responsible for providing benefits for the 
miners. The District Court, however, declined to issue an 
injunction ordering PMC to provide coverage, because, in 
the District Court's view, the criteria necessary for the 
issuance of an injunction had not been satisfied. The 
District Court also dismissed the complaint against the 
1993 Plan for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
 
PMC appealed from the order declaring that the Coal Act 
covered the disability pensioners and disabled miners. It 
also appealed from the District Court's order dismissing the 
complaint against the 1993 Plan. The 1992 Plan cross- 
appealed from the order denying a permanent injunction 




The principal issue before us concerns the interpretation 
of 26 U.S.C. SS 9711-12.2 Section 9711 describes the 
"continued obligations of individual employer plans" to 
provide retiree health benefits to former employees. 
Subsection (a), which is not at issue in this case, provides 
for continued coverage by the IEP for any individual who, 
as of February 1, 1993, was already receiving benefits from 
the IEP. Subsection (b)(1), which the 1992 Plan contends 
obligates PMC to provide coverage, states in pertinent part: 
 
       (b) Coverage of eligible recipients. (1) In general. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This appeal raises issues of statutory interpretation subject to 
plenary 
review. Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996). We reject the 
1992 Plan's suggestion that its position on coverage is entitled to the 
deferential standard of review set forth in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) (noting that, under trust law principles, 
when an ERISA plan confers discretion upon plan trustees to make 
eligibility determination, appellate review is for abuse of discretion). 
In 
this case, whatever discretion the 1992 Plan Trustees have in making 
eligibility determinations is bounded by the mandatory terms of the Coal 
Act. The eligibility determination here is whether the Coal Act provides 
coverage for disability pensioners and disabled miners. This is a question 
of pure statutory interpretation over which appellate review is plenary. 
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       last signatory operator3 of any individual who, as of 
       February 1, 1993, is not receiving retiree health 
       benefits under the individual employer plan maintained 
       by the last signatory operator pursuant to a 1978 or 
       subsequent coal wage agreement, but has met the age 
       and service requirements for eligibility to receive 
       benefits under such plan as of such date, shall, at 
       such time as such individual becomes eligible to 
       receive benefits under such plan, provide health 
       benefits coverage to such individual and the 
       individual's eligible beneficiaries which is described in 
       paragraph (2). This paragraph shall not apply to any 
       individual who retired from the coal industry after 
       September 30, 1994, or any eligible beneficiary of such 
       individual. 
 
26 U.S.C.A. S 9711(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 9712(b) 
describes the class of retirees eligible to receive benefits 
from the 1992 Plan: 
 
       (b) Coverage Requirement. (1) In general. The 1992 
       UMWA Benefit Plan shall only provide health benefits 
       coverage to any eligible beneficiary who is not eligible 
       for benefits under the Combined Fund and shall not 
       provide such coverage to any other individual. 
 
       (2) Eligible beneficiary. For purposes of this section, 
       the term "eligible beneficiary" means an individual who 
       -- 
 
       (A) but for the enactment of this chapter, would 
       be eligible to receive benefits from the 1950 UMWA 
       Benefit Plan or the 1974 UMWA Benefit Plan, 
       based upon age and service earned as of 
       February 1, 1993; or 
 
       (B) with respect to whom coverage is required to 
       be provided under section 9711, but who does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. 26 U.S.C.A. S 9701(c)(4) defines "last signatory operator" as meaning, 
"with respect to a coal industry retiree, a signatory operator which was 
the most recent coal industry employer of such retiree." "Signatory 
operator" means "a person which is or was a signatory to a coal wage 
agreement." 26 U.S.C.A. S 9701(c)(1). 
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       receive such coverage from the applicable last 
       signatory operator or any related person, 
 
       and any individual who is eligible for benefits by 
       reason of a relationship to an individual described in 
       subparagraph (A) or (B). In no event shall the 1992 
       UMWA Benefit Plan provide health benefits coverage to 
       any eligible beneficiary who is a coal industry retiree 
       who retired from the coal industry after September 30, 
       1994, or any beneficiary of such individual. 
 
26 U.S.C.A. S 9712(b) (emphasis added). 
 
PMC argues that, under the plain language of these 
provisions, the disability pensioners and miners are not 
covered because their eligibility was not based on meeting 
age and service requirements but was rather based solely 
on their having become disabled. The Trustees, on the 
other hand, contend that the statutory language may be 
read to mean only that the retiree must have met "whatever 
age or service requirements were applicable to the 
particular kind of pension he or she received (if any)." 
Appellees' Br. at 27. 
 
Since the time of the District Court's decision and the 
briefing in this case, the Fourth and District of Columbia 
Circuits have considered these alternative interpretations, 
and both courts have rejected the interpretation now 
advanced by PMC. Both courts acknowledged that this 
interpretation was reasonable, but both concluded that the 
Trustees' reading of the statutory language was also 
sufficiently plausible to render that language ambiguous. 
The District of Columbia Circuit, agreeing with the Fourth 
Circuit's approach, wrote: 
 
       The plausibility of these competing interpretations 
       underscores the ambiguity of the statute we are asked 
       to apply. In such instances, it becomes necessary for a 
       court to look to "the intent of Congress as revealed in 
       the history and purposes of the statutory scheme." . . . 
 
       The history and purposes of the Coal Act . . . 
       persuade us that the Trustees have the better part of 
       the statutory argument. As the Fourth Circuit observed 
       in a recent case presenting the identical question 
       concerning the scope of section 9711(b), 
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       [t]he historical background leading to the 
       enactment of the Coal Act makes clear that 
       Congress intended to provide coal industry retirees 
       with the lifetime benefits they had been promised. 
       Since coal workers had been promised health 
       benefits in the event of their retirement, whether 
       that retirement resulted from a disability or was 
       based solely on their satisfaction of age and service 
       requirements, we conclude that Congress intended 
       that coal industry workers who retired as a result 
       of a disability would be eligible for benefits under 
       S 9711(b)(1) and S 9712(b)(2). 
 
       Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 
       60[3] (4th Cir. 1999). 
 
Penn Allegh Coal Co., 183 F.3d at 864 (citations omitted). 
 
Although we see considerable merit in PMC's position 
and regard the question before us as close, we follow the 
decisions and adopt the reasoning of the Fourth and 
District of Columbia Circuits. We thus hold thatSS 9711-12 





PMC next argues that the disability pensioners are not 
eligible under SS 9711 and 9712 in any event because they 
did not retire--that is, file their pension applications-- 
before September 30, 1994. The Trustees contend, however, 
that a disability pensioner should be deemed to have retired 
on the date the disability occurs. The Trustees note that the 
Coal Act does not expressly require that a miner apply for 
a pension in order to be regarded as "retired," and the 
Trustees point out that the dictionary definition of the term 
"retired" does not refer to such a requirement. The Trustees 
further note that because a certification of total and 
permanent disability by the Social Security Administration 
is a prerequisite for a disability pension, and because the 
process of obtaining such a certification "can take upwards 
of several years," Appellees' Br. at 37 n.12, PMC's 
interpretation would result in "a `gap' in health benefits 
coverage solely because some period of time elapsed 
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between a person's disability (and the resulting involuntary 
cessation of work) and the date the person applied for 
benefits," id. at 37. The Trustees maintain that Congress 
did not want to produce such a result. See id . at 37. 
 
The Fourth Circuit considered this question in Big River 
Minerals Corp. and wrote: 
 
       The plain meaning of the word "retired" is"withdrawn 
       from or no longer occupied with one's business or 
       profession." The Random House College Dictionary 
       1127 (rev. ed. 1980). The plain meaning of the word 
       "retired," therefore, does not encompass only those 
       individuals who receive, or have applied for, pension 
       benefits. Thus, we reject Coal Companies' argument 
       that only those individuals who filed applications for 
       retirement benefits as of September 30, 1994 are 
       eligible for coverage under S 9711(b)(1) and 
       S 9712(b)(2). 
 
181 F.3d at 604. 
 
We follow the Fourth Circuit on this point. The statutory 
language provides no indication how retirement should be 
defined. Notably, there is no suggestion in the statutory 
text that a permanently and totally disabled retiree cannot 
be deemed retired until after he submits his application for 
retirement benefits. Fixing the date of retirement for a 
permanently and totally disabled employee when he applies 
for pension benefits may in many cases be unrealistic and 
unfair because such an employee may be so physically or 
mentally disabled as to be unable to apply for pension 
benefits until some later period or elapse of time. On the 
other hand, aligning the retirement date to the onset of 
permanent and total disability is a fair, clear and pragmatic 
mechanism for ensuring that persons claiming pension 
benefits are not bogus retirees. By definition, a person can 
no longer work if he or she is permanently and totally 
disabled. We therefore hold that the disabled pensioners 





The remaining issues in this appeal do not require 
lengthy discussion. 
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A. PMC contends that, even if the District Court was 
correct with respect to the disability pensioners, the 
disabled miners cannot be eligible beneficiaries under 
S 9712(b). PMC argues that "when these disabled miners 
become old enough to retire, they will receive age and 
service pensions based on an age attained and service 
earned after February 1, 1993," and they will therefore "fall 
outside of the criteria established for age and service 
pensioners" set forth in a notice issued by the 1992 Plan 
regarding eligibility criteria under SS 9711(b) and 9712 
(b)(2). Appellants' Br. at 35-36 (emphasis in original). 
Among other things, that notice stated that "[t]he miner 
must have been age and service eligible to receive a pension 
as of February 1, 1993." App. at 209. The Trustees respond 
that "[t]he fact that these individuals may later become 
eligible for pensions in no way affects their eligibility for 
health care under the Coal Act, because their health care 
eligibility is not based on receipt of a pension in the first 
place." Appellees' Br. at 44 (emphasis omitted). 
 
We agree with the Trustees. The disabled miners fall 
within SS 9711(b) and 9712(b)(2) because they were eligible 
to receive health benefits under the IEP and had 
"withdrawn from" their coal mining jobs by the cutoff date. 
Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d at 604 (internal 
quotations omitted). The fact that they might subsequently 
become eligible for age and service pensions does not take 
them outside the coverage of these provisions. The notice to 
which PMC refers was obviously not drafted with the 
special situation of disabled miners in mind. 
 
B. PMC appeals the District Court's dismissal of the 
complaint insofar as it pertained to the 1993 Plan. The 
District Court dismissed the complaint against the 1993 
Plan because the complaint failed to allege any act or 
omission on the part of the 1993 Plan that affected PMC. 
We agree that the complaint fails to state a viable claim 
against the 1993 Plan. 
 
The 1993 Plan has neither admitted nor denied coverage 
of the miners at issue here because the 1992 Plan has 
taken responsibility for providing health benefits to them, 
and lack of eligibility under the Coal Act is a prerequisite to 
coverage under the 1993 Plan. The 1993 Plan has not 
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taken any action that affects the legal interests of PMC. We 
see no error, therefore, in the District Court's dismissal of 
the complaint against the 1993 Plan. 
 
C. The 1992 Plan cross-appeals the District Court's 
denial of permanent injunctive relief. On appeal, PMC has 
conceded that permanent injunctive relief is proper if its 
interpretation of the statutory provisions discussed above is 
rejected. See PMC Reply Br. and Cross-Appellees Br. at 14 
n.3. We therefore reverse the decision of the District Court 
insofar as it denied permanent injunctive relief and remand 




In sum, we affirm the decision of the District Court 
except insofar as it denied the 1992 Plan's application for 
a permanent injunction. We reverse that portion of the 
decision and remand for further proceedings. 
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